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The upsurge of the outward direct investment (ODI) made by the Chinese firms in 
recent years is one of the main concerns among academic researchers and policy 
consultants targeting emerging market economies. In this paper, the focus for 
analysis is the internationalization and ODI initiated by Chinese private-owned 
enterprises (POEs). Starting with a check of key factors that shape the general 
environment for Chinese enterprises’ ODI and internationalization, the main theme 
of the paper is to assess conventional western theories on firm’s 
internationalization compared with the reality found amongst Chinese POEs. The 
conclusion is that the conventional western theories do not satisfactorily explain 
the realities found in China. An alternative framework is suggested, the SIL model, 
as a more convincing explanation for the ODI and internationalization of the 
Chinese POEs. The SIL model is a revised version of John Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm taking into account the Chinese POE’s experience. It accounts for the 
way in which the POEs focus on a market seeking orientation in the early stages of 
“going out”. 
Keywords: firm's internationalization, ODI, private enterprises, eclectic paradigm, 
and SIL model. 
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I. Introduction 
The internationalization of Chinese firms and overseas direct investment from China has been 
attracting increasing attention from researchers in international economics and policy makers in 
host countries as well. Main factors accounting for this increasing concern are at least two. One is 
a rapid increase of outbound FDI from China. Official statistics shows that the annual ODI made 
by Chinese firms reached over US$ 55.9 billion in 2008, nearly 19 times more than in 2003. (see 
figure 1). As a result, China has jumped from the thirteenth to fifth in the world ODI league table 
in only 4 years, i.e. from year 2005 to 2009 (see figure 2). At the same time, ever quick economic 
growth and increasing pressure on RMB Yuan’s appreciation act as dual accelerators that drive the 
Chinese firms seeking opportunities abroad. Another factor accounting for this increasing concern 
is an active involvement of the Chinese firms in the global cross-border M&A (merge and 
acquisition) activities. Several M&A activities targeted by Chinese firms in earlier time had even 
attracted attention of congressmen in the US and Russia respectively and eventually blocked 
acquisition attempts in the name of protecting national strategic industries.i  While the latest case, 
the global giant in automobile manufacturing, the US Ford, sold its Swedish Volvo to a small 
Chinese private owned cooperation, Geely, in 2008 had caused worldwide attention.
ii    



































       
                                                        
i  For example, the US governmental agency had blocked the acquisition attempt for UNCOL (Union Oil 
Company of California) from a Chinese state-owned enterprise, China Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC), with 
the huge pressure from congressmen in 2005. The American cooperation was eventually merged with Chevron 
Corporation. Russian parliament had also tried to block a similar acquisition attempt from a Chinese oil giant in 
2002. 
ii  The acquisition price seems astonishingly low. It is only $1.8 billion. But Ford had paid $6.45 billion to acquire 
Volvo in 1999.  3
  Fig. 1.    Increasing ODI from China 2000-2010 
    N o t e ：none financial (banking) investment only. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and State Statistics Bureau, China, 2009， 





















            F i g . 2   O D I   f l o w s :   C h i n a   vs. the major ODI countries in 2009（in US$ Bil.） 
         Source:  UNCTAD  (2010)  
In the late 1990s economists recognised that China was emerging as a major trading nation 
(Naughton, Barry, 1996). Towards the end of the first decade of this new century, 21
st century 
economists have to accept the reality that China is becoming a major ODI nation. The main 
concern a decade ago for international economic researchers regarding China’s emerging as a 
major trading nation used to be the possible shocks China brings to the world trade regime formed 
before that. The main concern currently is to understand the motivation and pattern of the Chinese 
firms’ internationalization and to provide a reasoned theoretical explanation for its focus, rate and 
impact etc..   
Objectively speaking, almost all economists and commentators in international economics and 
business study currently take the emerging Chinese multi-nation enterprises (CMNE) as the same 
ones that originated from a normal developing countries and then try to check them as “third 
world MNEs” following Lecraw’s earlier points of view. As we know, that since Lecraw (1977) 
created the concept “the third world MNEs” (TWMNEs), researchers have focused on the  4
difference between the ‘new kind of MNEs’ and the conventional ones, i.e. those from industrial 
countries. The differences have been spiked out in terms of ownership advantages, motivation, 
geographical orientation and mode of overseas activity. The majorities of writers follow the way 
of Dunning (1977, 1983) and suggest that the key to understanding lies in identifying the 
advantages available to the firms for their launch of internationalization. More specifically there 
are some who suggest that firms seek “adaptive advantage” (Wells, 1983; Lall, 1983). This view 
was supported by Tolentino (1993) and Dunning (with Narula, 1996).   
Most research on Chinese ODI and firms’ outbound expansion so far appears to adopt this 
approach, and a general tendency is to see Chinese firms as undifferentiated, being more a lease 
similar to those in a normal market economy. In reality, however, the Chinese firms are very 
different one kind from another as originated from an institutionally transition economy. Variety 
in ownership is a general characteristic with the Chinese firms. Even in China’s official business 
registration system, firms are explicitly classified into 14 categories, according to their ownership 
status. The 14 categories can be roughly regrouped into 3 types in accordance with their dominant 
ownership features: a) state-owned enterprises (SOEs), b) foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and 
c), private-owned enterprises (POEs), (see attachment, table 1). The behaviour of firms in these 
three types is often very different when making investment decision, especially ODI decisions. 
SOEs, for example, usually are influenced or even controlled by government in their ODI 
decisions. They often have to take responsibility for implementing state strategies, and their ODI 
activities usually are backed by state owned commercial banks. The POEs’, in contrast, behave 
more like firms in a normal market economy, although even here there are some policy supports 
towards such firms if the interests of the firms coincide to the strategic expectations of provincial 
or even central government. However, generally they operate as agents seeking profit 
maximization. Considering these fundamental realities, it is logically inappropriate to research 
Chinese firms and their ODI behaviors in the same way done with those in a normal market 
economy. It is obvious that only one group out of the three different groups of firms is suitable to 
be checked in the way done with the firms in a normal free market economy. That is POEs. In this 
paper, our focus shall be put on Chinese POEs’ ODI and internationalization.    5
II. POEs’ and Internationalization: Contextual factors 
Being rooted in an emerging market economy with unfinished institutional transition, the Chinese 
POEs are surviving and competing in a unique context, so are their ODI activities and 
internationalisation. It is impossible to analyse them in depth and make correct judgement on the 
future trend of their ODI expansion without paying attention to this critically important context. 
The uniqueness of the context for the Chinese POEs in their internationalisation originated from 
both international environment and domestic background of the development stages of social 
economy. The basic contextual factors could be checked from five macro visual angles at least. 
The First one is the historical visual angle with the worldwide FDI (foreign direct investment) 
flow and firms’ internationalization. Historically, the modern flow of the FDI, internationalization 
of firms and emerging of the MNCs (multi-national companies) can be seen as the one process in 
three different forms. Singer Company, a US sewing machine manufacturer, is generally identified 
as one of the pioneers in worldwide MNCs history. Its success in building an overseas 
manufacturing and distribution base in Scotland in 1868 is usually deemed as a symbol of the start 
of MNCs history and the modern flow of the FDI and internationalization of firms as well. Since 
then, the evolution process of the three forms joining together can be seen in three phases. Firstly, 
from the 19th century to 1950s, a single-nation-dominance phase can be roughly seen. The 
dominant nation is the US. Specifically, firms based in the US dominated the whole process. 
Statistics show that the share of global FDI made by US firms was over 55% in 1914 and climbed 
to over 60% before the great depression. (see fig.3). Secondly, from the late 1950s until 1989 
could be looked as a phase of “big-three” dominance. The firms dominating the ODI mainly came 
from the US, the EU (European Union) and Japan. The share of the US FDI dropped from 55% in 
1950s to 44% in 1975, 35.1% in 1985 to about 25% in 1990. The shares of both other big 
industrial countries, e.g. G7 countries, and the rest of the world had substantially increased their 
shares in the world outward FDI during the same time. (See fig.4). The third phase from 1990 to 
the present could be looked as a period of the worldwide competition。With the end of the “cold 
war” and the beginning of forms of market-based activity in the former central planed economies, 
there were very significant opportunities for FDI, initially by western firms but more recently by 
firms from the BRIC economies India, China, Russia and Brazil. The share of non-G7 countries in  6
FDI has increased substantially.(see fig.4).   
Fig. 3 Changing US shares in the world total FDI flow (1914-2008) 
             i n   p e r c e n t  
      Source: OECD, UNCTAD (related year). 
These three phases indicate a growing appetite for FDI, which can be seen as a struggle for 
position and long term advantage. Firms that have the interest, ability and opportunity to engage in 
this activity now find increasing competition for available resources. In the wake of the world 
recession from 2008 new long term opportunities arise for firms in nations whose banking systems 
have been relatively unaffected by a lack of credit. Chinese firms are likely to be in a good 
position to take up FDI opportunities as the currency remains strong and banks are willing to 
provide investment, so long as they can remain unaffected by the loss of consumer confidence.  
The period from 2008 – 2015 could reinforce the potential for firms in some of the BRIC 
economies to gain a significant international position.   
Fig.4 changing share of the major ODI nations, 1960-2008 






















































































          Source:  OECD,  UNCTAD  (related  year). 
The second macro visual angle is that of the globalization. Thomas Friedman (2006) 
divided the history of globalization into three periods.  He considered “3 versions” which 
imitate how IT software products are classified. Version 1.0 spans the period from 1492 to 
1800. The dominant factors of the globalization during this period had mainly been the 
maritime power of nations and imperialism. Version 2.0 (from 1800 till 2000), was the period 
when the MNE was the dominant force. Version 3.0 (from 2000 until today), is the period 
when the dominant factors influencing globalization are the internet, personal computers and 
e-commerce. The most important effect of the current period, according to Friedman, is the 
loss of domination by MNEs. Small firms or even individuals can partake in globalization and 
compete with giant companies in this new period of globalization. The current period of the 
globalization gives opportunities to small firms that were unconsidered even ten years ago. 
Chinese POEs such as AliBaba, have taken up the opportunities presented. The issue is to 
what extent are Chinese firms embracing the opportunities created by the internet and e 
commerce. 
The third macro visual angle is that of the forms of firm’s internationalization. Traditionally, 
firms engaged in ODI mainly take two forms; one is called as “Greenfield investment”, 
another, the cross-border M & A (merge and acquisition). More recently, along with the quick 
progressing of the internet technology, firms have outsourcing and contract manufacturing as 


























US other G7 other nations 8
business is not applicable in many fields, but it offers considerable opportunities for 
individuals and firms who have a viable business model and idea that can be securely adapted 
to a e commerce platform. It offers the possibility to creative entrepreneurs to leapfrog the 
limitations of local and physical constraints.     
The fourth macro visual angle is that of the economic strength of China as an emerging ODI 
nation .The economic strength of China is more likely to be sustainable than almost any other 
country during the latest world economic recession triggered by financial crises in 2008. The 
uninterrupted growth of the last three decades has provided huge reserves for investment.  
Recent research (Zhao, 2007), suggests that the social economy of China has reached the 
stage of high-mass consumption as defined by Rostow (1960). According to Rostow (1960, 
1978), the social economy in a typical industrial country experiences five stages in a way of 
evolution. They are “traditional society”, “pre-condition for taking off”, “taking off”, “driving 
to maturity”, and “high-mass consumption” respectively. His empirical study suggested that 
the USA entered the fifth stage, that of high-mass assumption, in the second decade of the 20
th 
century. He identified two characteristics as the main indicators for a country that enters this 
stage.  
i) Popularization of durable consumption goods. Rostow argued that the deciding factor 
in mass consumption was the popularisation of the private car.   
ii) Change in the social structure. Rostow thought that the most important factor was the 
rise of a significant middle class of professionals able to influence social and political 
outcomes.  
The Japanese economic historian, Hiroshi Takeuchi (1993) suggests that the Japanese social 
economy reached this stage (he called it a “consumption revolution”) by the 1970s. Three 
durable goods were keys. These were called the “three Cs”: colour TV sets, air conditioners 
and cars. Zhao’s research (Zhao, 2007) identified three indicators supporting the idea that the 
Chinese social economy is entering the high mass consumption stage. The three indicators 
are: 
i. Popularisation of high-grade durable consumption goods, including colour TV sets,  9
air conditioners, cars and digital products. 
ii. Ownership of property (houses and flats).     
iii. Leisure consumption.  In China there has been a shortening of the working week 
to five days, and an increase in paid holidays. This has stimulated leisure consumption. 
Official statistics shows that domestic tourism increased from 744 million to 1.9 billion 
from 2000 to 2009. Chinese citizens going overseas for tourism increased from 
10.47million to 47.66 million during the same time. 
In addition to these indicators of change Zhao (2007) suggested that the Chinese state has induced 
a key transformation in society. This is a transformation from a driving concern with production to 
consumption. This has been allied with a change from a stress on simple industrial efficiency to a 
stress on “construction of harmonizing society”.
i This includes the importance of quality of life 
issues and environment protection. The figures show that consumption had caught up and 
overtaken investment in the few years before recent world financial crises.
ii 
The development of a mass consumption social economy is based on increases in personal wealth 
and ability of investment. This is likely to have a positive effect on outward investment by 
Chinese POEs. 
The fifth macro visual angle is that of the governmental strategy and policy orientation towards 
internationalization of home firms. The Chinese government plays a significant role in the 
economy. To assess internationalisation trends of Chinese firms without considering governmental 
strategic policies would be mistaken. The Chinese government has declared a clear policy which 
was published in March 2000 and was called, “the ‘going-out’ for development strategy”.  The 
strategy includes encouraging Chinese enterprises to engage in trans-national investment where 
appropriate. The main objective was to promote the expansion of Chinese MNCs. The idea was to 
                                                        
i  Calling for the creation of a "harmonious society" was laid out and endorsed formally as a political doctrine by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at a plenary session of the party's Central Committee in October 2006. It 
signaled a shift in the party's focus from promoting all-out economic growth to solving worsening social tensions. 
(news report, “China's Party Leadership Declares New Priority: 'Harmonious Society'”, Washington Post, 
October 12, 2006. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101101610.html) 
ii  According to the official figure provided by the State bureau of Statistics, the contribution of the consumption 
demand to China’s GDP growth had used get a share of 38.6%, overtaken that of investment  （37.7％）in 2007. 
But it dropped to 37.3% in 2010 after government’s launched a large amount stimulus package since 2009.    10
make use of foreign and domestic markets and resources simultaneously.
i    With the launch of the 
strategy and related policies, government agencies began to be much more relaxed about Chinese 
POEs. From being restrictive the Chinese government has become more encouraging and 
supportive in tone. 
The implications of these contextual factors identified from different macro visual-angles are not 
difficult to get. The contextual factors identified from the first macro visual angle imply that firm’s 
internationalization and ODI flow are the trend of our time, no countries and firms with certain 
degree of importance can avoid to involve or to be involved in the process. The relevant Chinese 
firms need to decide how to best capitalise on their interest in the competition for international 
position. The factors found from the second and third visual angle suggest that even SMEs and 
some individual enterprises may need to assess how they can gain advantage from 
internationalisation. The factors identified from the fourth and fifth macro visual angles suggest 
that there is likely to be an increasing supply of investment and support from governmental 
policies for outward investment by Chinese enterprises, including POEs.     
III. POEs’ Internationalization: the Old theories and New Realities with Chinese POSs 
Within the contextual factor outlines above there are also a number of factors at both the industry 
or sector level and firm level influence the behavior of firm’s internationalization and decide the 
pattern and volume of ODI flow of a specific country like China. Of them include the factors 
which could ensure the internationalization and overseas investment of a specific firm; even a 
specific industry or country is successful, and then give real promotion to firm’s 
internationalization. Analysis of these factors in depth needs to check some important theoretical 
thinking on firm’s internationalization and outward FDI.   
Academically, most theoretical work on the ODI & firm’s internationalization so far can be 
roughly grouped into three categories according to the visual angle or main concern the related 
researches target. They are those targets the issues at macro level of an economy, i.e. national 
economy, those does the issues at sector level, and those does the issues at firm level respectively. 
There are quite a few different points of view backed with certain empirical work in each of the 
                                                        
i See  Zhao,  Wei.  “Going-out” of the Chinese Enterprises: the Orientation of the Government Policy and Analysis 
of Typical Cases (in Chinese), Economic Sciences Press, Beijing 2004.        11
three categories grouped above, but the influential ones are limited.           
A)  The  theories  covering  the  issues at macro level of an economy. 
The core question at this level is whether a specific economy as a whole or national economy 
has the ability to engage in overseas investment. If so, how strong the ODI waves shall be.   
Representative and one of the most influential theories at this level is that of “the investment 
development path (IDP)”, which was developed by Dunning (1982) as an expansion of his micro 
level analysis. According to his theory, the flow of FDI by a country would go through four 
periods linked with its growing strength (normally indicated as growth per capita GDP).  It was 
thought that no ODI would be likely in a country with below US$ 400 per capita GNP.  ODI 
would be expected, however, to overtake inward FDI above US$ 4000 per capita GNP.     
Dunning’s theory of IDP could provide some explanation with Chinese FDI. It is at such a 
high level, however, as to only offer understanding at the national level. Besides, even if at 
national, its power in explaining the net FDI flow (inflow minus outflow) in Chinese case is yet to 
be proved as China have been the second biggest FDI  host country since 2005. The net ODI 
flow in China has still been negative figures so far. The latest year, year 2008, China attracted 
$95.2 billion FDI but made $55.9 billion ODI, the net ODI flow is negative $39.3 billion. (see 
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Figure: China’s Increasing per capita GNP and Change changing ODI flow, 1985-2008  12
Source: MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment related 
years; China State Bureau of statistics database. 
i 
B) The theories covering the issues at Industrial sector level.   
The core question at this level is what kind of industrial sectors are more likely to engage in 
ODI. Representative theory in this category is that of “marginal industry expansion” created by 
Kiyoshi Kojima. Based on the empirical research of the ODI and internationalization of the 
Japanese industries in 1960s and 70s, Kojima (1977) suggested that “the outward direct 
investment for a nation should start from the industry that has already lost its comparative 
advantage”. 
Objectively speaking, nonetheless, it is hard to find a Chinese industrial sector that has 
reached this marginal situation. One of the reasons is that there are huge less developed areas in 
China. Most manufacturing industries in the advanced coastland areas could, in theory, exploit the 
inland areas as soon as they lose comparative advantage in coastal areas. So this approach does 
not merit further consideration. 
C) The theories covering the issues at firm level.   
The basic question explored at this level is what sort of firms has the ability to successfully 
engage in ODI.    Four key theories that deal with this question include:   
i.  Monopolistic advantage theory (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969). According to this 
theory, firms invest outside of the home country when they have monopolistic 
advantages.   
ii.  Product life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966, 1979, 1986). According to this theory, firms 
undertake FDI at a particular stage in their life-cycle. The firm creates production 
sites close to relevant markets as the products mature and demand in new markets 
increases.   
iii.  Internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976, Buckley, 1988). This argument 
suggests that it is in the interests of firms to internalizing when the transaction costs 
of market operations are high.   
                                                        
i  Also see Dong Jiang (2010), fig.5.2,    13
iv.  The eclectic theory or “OLI paradigm” (Dunning, 1976). According to this theory, 
three factors could possibly explain the approach to internationalization taken by a 
specific enterprise. There are three key possible advantages to firms in consideration 
of engagement on international direct investment: ownership advantages, location 
advantage and internalization advantages. Assessment of these factors helps answer 
the question why firms begin investing abroad, why firms select particular 
destinations, and why firms select one particular method of market entry over another 
(Dunning, 1988).In Dunning’s approach ownership advantage is defined as “any kind 
of income-generating asset that allows firms to engage in foreign production”. Three 
types of ownership advantages have been suggested: first, monopolistic advantages; 
second, technology and knowledge advantages; third, other types of advantage such 
as learning or management capabilities or advantages.   
Excepting theories abstracted as above, there are several other ones created with the cases of 
developing countries. All main theories with certain influence regarding the key elements the 
firms can rely in their internationalization can be summed up with following table. 
Table 1.    Main theories and the key elements stressed regarding outward FDI at firm level 
 Theory  Creators    Key  advantages 
Monopolistic 
Advantage Theory 
 Stephen  Hymer, 
1960 
Technology innovation, 
manufacturing process, brand names, 
organizational talents, marketing 
skill, etc. 




original products, know-how 
Theory of 
Internalization 
Peter, Buckley &   
Casson (1976); 
Rugman (1981) 
Firm-specific advantages (FSAs) in 











location advantages,   






Lower cost via small-scale 
production, domestic brand, 




countries  Local winner  Lall (1983)  Localized technology advantage 
 
Chinese POEs do not appear, generally, to have clear ownership advantages. For example, few 
Chinese POEs have exclusive intellectual property rights, patents, know-how and extraordinary 
management or marketing skills. Even official investigations have suggested that most Chinese 
firms lack an ability to innovate.  In SOEs this is a a matter of concern, with 75% of the top 
28,000 SOEs not having one person engaged full time in R&D (Political Consultant Committee of 
P R China, Inspection Report, 2006
i). The situation amongst POEs is even worse. An earlier 
investigation led by a high rank official shows that out of 100 POEs only 11 have certain 
independent R & D abilities, all others have no real research ability at all, and rely on outside 
R&D sources (Huang, Mengfu, 2007).     
IV. POEs’ Internationalization：Theoretic Explanation Based on Case Studies 
It seems as though we have now encountered a dilemma situation between old theories and new 
realities faced by Chinese POEs. On the one hand, it is hard to find any obvious advantages 
stressed by representative theories on firm’s internationalization, especially those covering the 
issues at sector and firm levels, among Chinese POEs, on the other hand, however, the it has 
already been an real existence that Chinese POEs have already made substantial ODI in the past 
decades and are increasingly doing this currently. Conclusion is not difficult to get that is the old 
theories can not explain new realities. The way out of this dilemma situation undoubtedly is to 
create new theory in accordance with the new realities faced by Chinese firms in the peculiar 
context of China as an emerging market economy.     
A temptation of creating new theory with the aim of adapting to Chinese context and realities 
needs to take two basic elements into account. One is the characteristics of factor endowments of 
                                                        
i  A report cited by Xinhua News Agency, “Inspection shows that 75% of Chinese firms have no professional 
research person,” Xinhua News Agency, 5
th July 2006. 
http://sientechina.china.com.cn/chinese/diaocha/1266293.htm      15
China, and other the practice, especially the successful cases in their preliminary exploration of 
internationalization and outward direct investment.   
i. Factor endowments in China.   
The most important feature of the Chinese economy is the existence of a huge inland area of 
potential demand. There is also a large supply of labour. Because of this Kojima’s theory of 
“marginal industry expansion” (1977) is inappropriate in the Chinese situation. In China if an 
industrial sector reaches a marginal situation in the East coast area, there is space for expansion 
inland. So there is no need to consider ODI. In addition, the uncompetitive and largely inelastic 
supply of cheap labour means that China is an ideal country to develop and maintain the 
comparative advantage in labour intensive sectors. 
ii. Experience of POEs in internationalizing and institutional transformation. 
To understand the way in which firms have succeeded in becoming international enterprises a 
detailed analysis of case studies is likely to provide the best insight. Although it is hard to make 
estimation about how many percent of the POEs’ ODI and internationalization is successful owing 
to the fact that there are neither official statistics on it no mechanism of reporting firms’ failure in 
ODI initiatives  Nonetheless, it is not difficult to identify some good cases among those who 
have already involved in internationalization and ODI substantially in the last decade.   
Out of thousands of POEs that have already involved in certain amount of ODI and business 
internationalization, following three are the representative ones in the sectors of manufacturing 
industry they engage in and can be taken as typical cases to check in depth.   
Case 1: Lenovo Group. 
Lenovo， being also known as “Lianxiang Group” in Chinese， was the largest PC manufacturer and 
distributer in the Chinese domestic market even before it merged with IMB’s PC division in 2004. 
Lenovo paid US$ 1.25 billion for the PC division, including 650 million US dollars in cash and 
Lenovo's shares valued at 600 million US dollars. This catapulted the firm into international 
markets making it into a major MNE almost overnight. Its approach of internationalization could 
be called as “trading capital for brand and oversea market”. Two characteristics are identifiable in 
Lenovo’s internationalization: one is related to its strategic target of internationalization. The  16
strategic target Lenovo set for its internationalization is erecting its brand in PC manufacturing, 
which in turn serves the target of the expansion in the global PC market. Another is related to its 
way of inputting capital. It is generally believed that Lenovo is overwhelmingly relying on huge 
capital investment in pursuing its strategy of internationalization. These characteristics had been 
shown clearly in its two most important actions of internationalization so far. The first one is its 
competing into the sixth “TOP” (The Olympic Plan) in 2004. It became the one of the top 
commercial donators of the International Olympic game in 2004. The agreement signed with the 
IOC (International Olympic Committee) shouldered the Lenovo the responsibility of funding the 
IOC US$65 million and supplying its IT equipments for the XX Olympic Winter Games in Turin, 
Italy, in 2006 and the XXIX Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. In return, Lenovo can use the 
logo of IOC's worldwide partners to promote its brand and sales in the global market during the 
four-year tenure. The second important action is its acquisition of the PC Business of the IBM 
(International Business Machine) during the winter through spring of 2004 to 2005. Lenovo has 
eventually paid US$ 1.25 billion for all the PC business of IBM, including 650 million US dollars 
in cash and Lenovo's shares valued at 600 million US dollars.   
Lenovo took an active stance in buying position internationally. It recognized the need to develop 
and maintain a good reputation for its brand in international markets and was prepared to invest in 
order to achieve that, in the hope that sales would follow.     
Case 2: Huawei Group.   
Huawei is one of the world’s major providers of telecommunication equipment.  Staring from a 
small tech-development company with a registered capital of less than 100 thousands YMB Yuan 
(less than US$ 12,000) in 1988, it has become one of the biggest Chinese MNCs currently. Its 
business spans the whole chain of the industry, from research and development to manufacturing, 
from marketing to after sales maintenance. Huawei’s internationalization approach can be called 
as that of “International Strategic Partnership approach”. It has developed two types of 
partnership.   
First one can be called as the way “via joint ventures”. That is building joint ventures with 
strategic partners to provide telecommunications equipments.    The joint ventures usually cover a  17
business chain for a particular telecom product. Two joint ventures with big MNEs which 
representative the approach taken by Huawei are with Siemens and Motorola. They focus on 
TD-SCDMA (telecommunications equipment) with Siemens and UMTS products with Motorola.   
Second one can be called as “management learning”. Since 1997 Huawei has paid management 
consulting companies to learn how to deal with managing an international company. The 
consultants used include IBM, the Hay Group, PwC &FhG. As a result of this investment, Huawei 
has developed into a global company. By 2006 it had eight regional headquarters with more than 
100 branches world wide. There were 28 overseas training centers. Ooverseas employees were  
over 60% of the total workforce. It had 12 R&D centers in the US, India, Sweden, Russia and 
China. So the approach taken by Huawei was a management learning and seeking motivation to 
drive the firm to better international performance.   
  Case 3: Wanxiang Group.  
Wanxiang is a medium-sized POE in the motor vehicle parts industry. Wanxiang has successfully 
internationalized itself in the last two decades. The approach of the Wanxiang’s 
internationalization can be called as that of “via outsourcing ladders”. It was mainly through 
outsourcing business that brought the firm into the process of internationalization and made it 
access to several good opportunities in its pursuing MNC strategy. 
Wanxiang’s gradualism process of internationalization and ODI can be divided into four stages. 
The first stage was exporting products as an outsourcing contractor. In 1984 Wanxiang gained its 
first overseas contract (for auto gimbals) from a US company as an OEM (original equipment 
manufacturer). It grasped the opportunity and expanded its export of products to the North 
American market over the next ten years.   
The second stage was to make sales abroad. By the early 1990s it had sufficient funding to build a 
small branch in the USA. This enabled Wanxiang to open sales branches in the USA.     
The third stage was to engage in M&A activity to grow internationally. It took advantage in 1998 
and 2001 of a financial crisis in the USA to buy firms. It acquired a medium-sized auto-parts 
dealer, and a Nasdaq-listed major brakes maker (Universal Automotive Industries Inc.). These  18
firms also were the main buyers of its outsourcing products. So Wanxiang gained a sales network 
and some brands, patents and equipment. These acquisitions changed Wanxiang’s position from a 
simple contract manufacturer into the second party in the chain of outsourcing.       
The fourth stage was expansion to become a significant MNE. It began to expand its business in 
other industries and other countries. By 2008, Wanxiang had 18 facilities in 8 countries and 
engaged in business in several industries. 
From the three cases above, some common features can be identified.   
The first common feature from all these firms is the ability of mass produce and supply product at 
low unit cost. All three enterprises have this ability. Lenovo had been the largest PC manufacturer 
in China since 1990. Huawei has been a leader in providing next generation telecommunications 
networks since around 2000. Its products and equip-system in telecommunication are adopted by 
more than 1 billion users in more than 100 countries. In 2006, 70% of its turnover was in oversea 
markets. Wanxiang is also a leading supplier of car parts in China and in other markets. Annual 
turnover reached RMB￥11.8 billion ( approximately US$1.5 Billion) in 2006. 
The second feature is that overseas expansion was based on success in the Chinese market and 
backed with quick expansion of the domestic manufacturing and distribution. All those firms 
growing from nearly nothing to giants in the related sector took very short time. To Lenovo or 
Legend, it took 12 years, i.e. from 1984 to 1996,
i  in developing from nearly nothing to a leading 
company in the Chinese market, and another four years, 1996 to 2000, became one of the top 10 in 
world's best managed PC venders, and its share price dramatically increases and became a 
constituent stock of the Hang Seng Index - HK flagship high-tech stock. 
The third common feature is that the sectors these enterprises are engaged in still have great 
potential for growth in the Chinese market. The PC market in China, for example, is potentially 
largest PC market in the world. China currently provides more than half of the world’s production 
of laptop PCs, and almost a third of all desktop PCs.    At the same time, the Chinese PC market is 
the largest in the world and the quickest growing.         
                                                        
i  Lenovo founded with an initial capital of RMB ¥ 200,000, (US$25,000) by Liu Chuanzhi and his colleagues 
engage in computer science research in 1984.  19
In the telecommunication and auto vehicle industries, the domestic market is huge. The rapid 
growth in domestic markets is due to consumer demand in China. The demands of 1.3 billion 
people give Chinese firms great opportunities to make the best use of “home-market effects”. 
All these common features obviously point to an important concept in economics. That is “the 
economies of scale”. All these cases show that economies of scale are the most important element 
the Chinese POEs can rely on in their outward expansion and ODI. Only with this element most 
POEs have a clear advantage over their foreign competitors. This element actually plays key role 
in POEs’ internationalization. 
  Accordingly, looking with the view of the key elements or advantages stressed by various 
theories on ODI at firm level being summed up earlier, economies of scale undoubtedly is the 
similar advantage that the Chinese POEs can make use of in launching their internationalization 
and  ODI  strategies.       
V. SLI Model: a feasible pattern of internationalization for the Chinese POEs 
In the case of the Chinese POEs discussed above, although the two forms of economies of scale, 
e.g. internal and external economies of scale, are available to them simultaneously for 
internationalization, the latter seems more important than the former. It is true that there are do 
internal economies of scale that can be extracted from quick expansion of single firms. As we 
have already seen that all the three POEs had experienced quick expansion from very beginning 
till latest time. This means all of these POEs had enjoyed increasing economies of scale resulted 
simply from the extensive expansion of production size. But their ever quick expansions rely on 
the expansion of the whole sectors. In this sense, the external economies of scale generated from 
high-speed growth of main sectors are more important. As a matter of fact, all the three sectors, 
from personal computers to automobile manufacturing, to telecommunication, have grown up as 
the world number one sectors in China in less than three decades. This undoubtedly provided 
substantial opportunities for firms engaged in the related sector to harvest the benefits in terms of 
scale  economies.     
The great advantage that Chinese POEs have had in the period 2000 – 2008 has been the ability to 
gain economies of scale. The ability of POEs to lower the unit cost of products originates mainly  20
from these scale economies. The economies of scale, especially the external economies of scale, 
enjoyed by most Chinese POEs mainly related to two phenomena. One is the agglomeration of 
manufacturing industries in China; another, nearly inelasticity supply of cheap labor force.   
Being benefited mainly from the elements that reflected by above two phenomena, a specific 
manufacturing sector can grow quickly and top the world in terms of production size. As a matter 
of fact, China has already topped the other economies in production of hundreds of manufacturing 
products. One official bulleting in earlier time shows that there had been 172 categories of 
manufacturing goods made in China topped the world in terms of annual output by 2006. It is 
exactly that year when China’s manufacturing output, being calculated in current exchange rate, 
took over that of Japan and got the second largest position after the US.
i Related research and 
estimation suggest that more and more sectors in China’s manufacturing industry have gown into 
the world largest ones. Such sectors consist of both traditional one and new one, the largest 
manufacturing sectors include the following several; 
  Textile and clothing-dying industry. Its output topped the world since 2005 and shares 
over one third of that of the world since then; 
  Garment industry. China shares a quarter in world market currently. “made in China” in 
this industrial sector shares 17.5% of the global “value chain” and one half of retail 
value. Currently. 
  Shoe and foot wearing manufacturing. It has topped the world for more than a decade.   
  Home electricity product industry. China has topped the world in manufacturing 7 
categories of home-use electricity products and got a share of over one-third of the 
world in each of the seven products including micro-oven (more than 80%),vacuum 
cleaner(over 40％), rice cooker( about 90%), refrigerate (about 1/3), air-conditioner (1/3) 
and washing machine( about 1/3). 
  Automobile manufacturing. China has overtaken that of the US and become the largest 
automobile maker with a total output of 18 million cars and trucks in 2010. 
Besides, in the manufacturing of parts and equipments of “new energy” industries, China has also 
formed a substantial ability only in few years. Its output of batteries required in solar energy has 
already topped the world with a shared of over 40% of the world output in 2009.           
Theoretically, the economies of scale in all major manufacturing industries are not difficult to 
estimate. It can be done with multi approaches as we described separately ( see appendix). The 
preliminary check with one sector out of the above several, the automobile industry, shows that 
                                                        
i  Xinhua News Agency, “Made in China’s growth rate kept the world champion in successively 20 years”, 
People’s Daily, overseass edition, 5
th May 2008.    21
sector did get substantial economies of scale during the 11 years up to 2008. (see appendix 1). It is 
exactly during those years that the automobile manufacturing sector in China had experienced a 
near explosive expansion in terms of not only the whole vehicles but the part manufacturing. 
It is obvious that both the Chinese firms and foreign invested ones can naturally enjoy the benefits 
of the external economies of scale in all these sectors. They also have greater opportunities to 
grow themselves into the world-class giants and reap the benefits of internal economies of scale as 
well in China than other countries. 
As we had mentioned earlier, the ‘OLI paradigm created by Dunning is an eclectic framework  
which brings all elements that are key for firm’s internationalization together. Separately checking, 
all the three elements had already been identified out and stressed by earlier researchers on firm’s 
internationalization and ODI. Dunning’s innovation comes mainly from his way of thinking. He 
took a synthesizing view and brought about a new framework. This framework is still very useful 
in analyzing the behavior and approaches of almost all sorts of firms in pursuing outward FDI and 
internationalization currently. 
Looking into the cases of the Chinese POEs which have been successful in becoming MNEs with 
an eclectic framework, nothing is new except that they substitute the ownership advantages in 
Duning’s sense for economies of scale, especially external economies of scale. The other two 
elements in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, i.e. location advantage and internalization, are basically 
same here in the case of POEs as they both are enterprise specific. 
It is reasonable to suggest a new version of the OLI paradigm for Chinese enterprises. This could 
be called the SLI paradigm.    Here S is the scale economies that can be relied by firms in making 
ODI; L is the location advantage and I is the internalization advantage. The key advantages relied 
by firms pursuing internationalization strategies can be compared with the following table. 
Table 2. Advantages of the two eclectic paradigms compared          22
Considering one of the contextual factors we identified earlier, the outsourcing, as a ladder being 
available to the Chinese POEs in their internationalization, the third key factor, internalization 
advantage,    in SLI model, needs to be reinterpreted. It can be redefined including the partnership 
via the form of outsourcing.       
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Conclusion can be drawn out naturally as following.   
-- The five factors we identified from macro visual angles imply that it has already been 
a general and even irreversible trend for an emerging economy like China to involve in 
ODI  with an increasing pace as every contextual factor is throwing stimulation or 
pressure on the ODI flow and drive Chinese firms going abroad. 
-- Traditional theories developed mainly with the experience made by the firms in 
pioneering industrial economies only have limited inspiration in the study of the Chinese 
firms’ ODI and cannot be used simply in explaining Chinese cases, especially the Chinese 
POEs’ practice of internationalization. The basic reason behind this contradiction is that 
the realities the old theories being educed are totally different from that faced by Chinese 
POEs currently. New theory needs to be created in order to explain the behavior and 
approaches of the Chinese POEs’ internationalization. This requires case studies with 
POEs that have already made successful exploration of ODI and internationalization so 
far. 
-- Study of representative cases that successfully launched ODI and internationalization 
Advantages in OIL pattern  Advantages in SIL pattern 
Ownership 
advantages  
Trademark, production technique, 
entrepreneurial skills, returns to scale) 
Two forms; external one 
plays key role   
Location  existence of raw materials, low wages, 
special taxes or tariffs 
Same  
Internalization  partnership arrangement such as licensing 
or a joint venture 
Partnership in the form of 
outsourcing   23
among Chinese POEs chosen from three typical industrial sectors in China shows that they 
share a common feature at sector level, it is economies of scale. All the three Chinese 
originated MNEs had made full use of huge domestic market and lower cost of 
none-capital factors of production in their expansion. All of them had enjoyed the benefit 
from economies of scale, especially the external economies of scale extracted from the 
quick expansion of the whole sectors. 
-- Economies of scale, especially external economies of scale,  can be fitted into the 
framework of the eclectic paradigm being suggested by Dunning and taken as a peculiar 
advantage the Chinese POEs can make use in their internationalization and ODI initiatives. 
Looking in this way, the road of ODI and internationalization the Chinese POEs cut so far 
can be called as the SLI paradigm. It is a renewed version of OLI paradigm.   
It is also expectable that by relying on scale economies and low cost in the process of 
mabufacturing, the Chinese POEs can utilize the advantages of expanding into MNEs. The 
strategic objectives of POEs’ as MNEs need to be adjusted in the light of the resources 
available, the capability and capacity of the organization, and their economic interests. 
This takes time to identify. So the whole process of internationalization may take place in 
several stages. Three stages are predictable for most POEs in pursuing their specific 
internationalization strategies with making use of the advantages in a SLI paradigm. 
In the first stage, the strategic objective of internationalization for the most POEs is to gain market 
share and revenues. This can be done by making full use of Chinese scale economies. It is possible 
for most POEs to both have products “made in China” and “distributed by Chinese firms”. 
In the second stage, POEs commonly need to adjust their objective from market-expansion into 
brand development. This means creating a reputation for their brands which is valued by 
customers.   
In the third stage, some POEs will find it natural and easy to transfer their resource and attention 
to R&Ds.   
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Appendices 
A- 1. Scale economies in Chinese automobile industry: a simple measuring
i 
There is not generally accepted approach to measure economies of scale of an industrial sector so 
far. Nonetheless, indicators of both output-scale elasticity and scale efficiency are increasingly 
used in case studies in recent years. Parametric method need to set production function, and then 
choose corresponding index to get the econometric regression results based on the production 
function. Normally, according to the elasticity coefficient, we could judge whether scale is 
efficient or not. If the total output elasticity is greater than one, it indicates that the scale of 
economy is efficient, otherwise, it is inefficient. According to the form of production function it 
could be also divided into C-D production function method, CES production function method and 
super logarithmic model method. Represented by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA and Data 
Envelopment order),the nonparametric method was put forward by Charnes, Coopor and Rhodes 
                                                        
i  This calculation is mainly made by YY Han and Jing Wang under author’s guidance.  26
in 1978,and its principle is keeping the Decision unit (DMU, Decision Making Unit) of an input or 
output unchanged, and each decision unit is onto the DEA production frontier surface. Then we 
could estimate the relative efficiency through comparing the deviation degree between each 
Decision Making Units and DEA frontier. It does not need to set parameters and not need to set 
specific production function. Using this method, the scale efficiency refers to the gap of the real 
scale and optimal scale and it reflects the estimated object or decision unit is whether in the most 
appropriate investment scale. 
Domestic research on industry scale economy evaluation usually made by comparing with foreign 
economy. More specially, we use nonparametric method to evaluate the scale efficiency of 
automotive industry. DEAP2.1 software and multi-stage analysis are used to estimate scale 
efficiency. Following is the detail of using this method to estimate of China automobile industry 
economies of scale and economies of scale effect.   
Data description   
The objective of this section is to examine the scale efficiency in the automobile industry with  
DEA approach based the data from CSMAR and DRC net. Since there is still unavailable standard 
for this study, we also classified and compared several groups by selecting different kinds of 
input-output indicators. 
In the first step, scale efficiency has been calculated covering the period 2003-2008. In order to 
have a deeper understanding of Scale Efficiency in the automotive industry, the automotive 
industry is subdivided into five sectors according to the classification in CSMAR database. The 
five sectors are vehicles manufacturing (C3721), automotive modifications manufacturing 
(C3722), electric cars manufacturing (C3723), bodies and trucks manufacturing (C3724), 
automotive components and parts manufacturing (C3735). Considering BCC-DEA model with 
IRS (increasing returns to scale), number of employees and fixed assets are deemed as the input 
variables, output is measured by both using profit and gross industrial output value.   
Table  A-1.  Measuring  scale  efficiency in automotive industry, 1999-2008   
  A1 B1 A2 B2 AB 
year  SE RS SE RS SE RS SE RS SE RS 
1999  0.987 IRS 0.297 IRS 0.987 IRS 0.298 irs  0.869 IRS 
2000  1 _  0.404  IRS  1 _  0.404 irs  1 _ 
2001  0.676 IRS 0.989 IRS 0.777 IRS 0.996 irs  0.777 IRS 
2002  0.764  IRS 1  _  0.892 IRS 1  _  0.892  IRS  27
2003  0.682  IRS 1  _  0.877 IRS 1  _  0.877  IRS 
2004  0.695 IRS 0.973 IRS 0.748 IRS 0.975 irs  0.748 IRS 
2005  0.778 IRS 0.987 IRS 0.778 IRS 0.987 irs  0.658 IRS 
2006  0.979 IRS 0.975 DRS 0.979 IRS 0.975 drs 0.916 IRS 
2007  1 _  0.984  DRS 1 _  0.984 drs  1 _ 
2008  1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 
Notes: scale efficiency and return to scale is simplified as SE, RS respectively. IRS= Increasing 
return to scale. 
Source: Based on data in CSMAR, 1999-2008. 
Result in table A-1 shows that   
  There had been increasing scale efficiency in Group A subsector during the calculating 
years.  
  The scale efficiency even reached to nearly optimum level (SE=1) towards the end of 
calculating duration although it shows a U-shaped change in group B.   
A-2. Table 1: classification of the Chinese enterprises officially 
      
Number of 
firms , ,000 
Share (％) 
   Total    3250  100 
1  State-owned 179  5.5 
2  Collectively-owned  343 10.5 
3  Shared partnered  107 3.3 
4  State-owned pooling  3  0.1 
5  Collectively-owned pooling  6 0.2 
6  State-collective jointed  3  0.1 
7  Other jointed  5 0.1 
8  State-owned exclusively companies  1  0.3 
9  Other Companies LTD.    345 10.6 
10 Shared  ltd  61  1.9 
11  Private-owned enterprises  1982 61 
12  Other domestically-invested firms  54 1.7 
13 
Firms invested from H.K., Macao 
and Taiwan 
74 2.3 
14 Foreign  invested  78  2.4  28
Sources: China State Statistics Bureau, 2006 
A-3. Table 2 Distribution of China's outward FDI flows by industrial sectors, 2004-2009 
(millions of US $) 




288.66 105.36 185.04 271.71 171.83 342.79
B Mining  1800.21 1675.22 8539.51 4062.77 5823.51  13343.09
C Manufacture  755.55 2280.40 906.61 2126.50 1766.03 2240.97
D 
Power and other 
utilities 
78.49 7.66 118.74 151.38 1313.49 468.07
E Construction  47.95 81.86 33.23 329.43 732.99  360.22
F 
Transport,warehousing 
& postal service 
828.66 576.79 1376.39 4065.48 2655.74 2067.52




799.69 2260.12 1113.91 6604.18 6514.13 6135.75
I 
Residential & catering 
trade 
2.03 7.58 2.51 9.55 29.5 74.87
J Finance  -- -- 3529.99 1667.80 14048  8733.74
K Real  estate  8.51 115.63 383.76 908.52 339.01  938.14
L 
Leasing & business 
service 
749.31 4941.59 4521.66 5607.34 21717.23 20473.78
M 
Science research, 
service & geo-survey 
18.06 129.42 281.61 303.90 166.81 775.73
N 
Water, environment & 
public facility 
management 




88.14 62.79 111.51 76.21 165.36 267.73
P Education  -- -- 2.28 8.92 1.54  2.45
Q 
Public health & social 
welfares 
0.01 -- 0.18 0.75 0 1.91
R 
Cultural, sports & 
entertainment 
0.98 0.12 0.76 5.10 21.8 19.76
S 
Public management & 
social organization 
0.04 1.73 -- -- -- -- 29
Total 
 
5497.99 12261.17 21163.96 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99
Source: 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, MOFCOM. 
 
Table 3.    The top 50 non-financial Chinese TNCs ranked by foreign assets, 2009 
No.  Name of Enterprises  status of ownership 
1    China National Petroleum Corporation  Central SOEs 
2    China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd.  Central SOEs 
3    China Petrochemical Corporation  Central SOEs 
4    China National Offshore Oil Corporation  Central SOEs 
5    China Merchants Group  Central SOEs 
6    China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company  Central SOEs 
7    China Mobile Communications Corporation  Central SOEs 
8    China State Construction Engineering Corporation  Central SOEs 
9    Aluminum corporation of China  Central SOEs 
10    Sinochem Corporation  Central SOEs 
11   Huawei  Technologies  POE 
12    China National Cereals, Oils& Foodsuffs Corp.  Central SOEs 
13    Legend Holdings Ltd.  POE 
14    China Power Investment Corporation  Central SOEs 
15    China Unicom Corporation  Central SOEs 
16    Shum Yip Holdings Company Limited  Local State-Owned 
17    Yunnan Copper Co., Ltd  Local State-Owned 
18    China Minmetals Corporation  Central SOEs 
19    Hunan ValinIron & Steel(Group) Co.Ltd  Local State-Owned 
20    GDH Limited  Local State-Owned 
21    China National Aviation Holding Corporation  Central SOEs 
22    China Shipping (Group) Company  Central SOEs 
23    CITIC Group  Central SOEs 
24    China Poly Group Corporation  Central SOEs 
25   SinoSteel  Corporation  Central  SOEs 
26    China Huaneng Group  Central SOEs 
27    Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co.,LTD  Local State-Owned 
28    Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Limited  Local State-Owned 
29    Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings Limited  Local State-Owned 
30    SINOTRANS Changjiang National Shipping (Group) Co.  Central SOEs 
31    China Metallurgical Group Cop.  Central SOEs 
32    China National Chemical Corporation  Central SOEs 
33    China Communications Construction Company Ltd.  Central SOEs 
34   ZTE  Corporation  POE 
35    China Norh Industries Group Corporation  Central SOEs 
36   Shougang  Corporation  Local  State-Owned 
37    Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation  Central SOEs  30
38    Changsha Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science & Technology 
Development Co. Ltd 
Local State-Owned 
39    State Grid Corporation of China  Central SOEs 
40    China Nonferrous Metal Mining & Construction (group) Co., 
Ltd. 
Central SOEs 
41    Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation  Local State-Owned 
42   China  Electronics  Corporation  Central SOEs 
43   China  Telecom  Central SOEs 
44    China International    Marine Containers(Group) Ltd.  POE 
45    CSSD Venture Capital Co., Ltd  POE 
46    China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation  Central SOEs 
47   China  Railway  Construction  Corporation  Limited  Central SOEs 
48    Jiangsu Shagang Group  Local State-Owned 
49    China National Gold Group Corporation  Central SOEs 
50    Jinchuan Group Ltd.  Local State-Owned 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2009, MOFCOM, 
2010. 